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Canada stock mispricings are estimated based on the models in Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Pástor and Veronesi (2003). Four sets of 
mispricing estimates are estimated by applying two estimation methods, Fama-MacBeth 
approach and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) three-step regression procedure, to each of the 
two models. We use both OLS and fixed-effects methods with clustered standard errors 
to assess potential determinant variables. We find that the industry Mining, Oil and Gas 
has the highest incidence of mispricing, while Information and Communication has the 
lowest incidence. We provide empirical evidence that stock mispricing is determined by 
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Canadian Stock Mispricings and Their Determinants 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In perfect capital markets, stock prices reflect investors’ rational expectations of future 
cash flows. The prices are irrelevant to capital structures and corporate policies in the 
absence of frictions, as they should always be equal to fundamental values. If such were 
not the case, market participants would take advantage of all possible arbitrage 
opportunities and cause prices to revert back to their fundamental values. Hence, there is 
no role for mispricing from the classical finance theory perspective in a world without 
frictions. 
The real markets environment can, however, never satisfy the rigorous 
assumptions of perfect markets. There are always transaction costs, asymmetric 
information, agency problems, and government interventions. Additionally, economists 
and psychologists in the field of behavioral finance insist that investors are barely 
identical or fully rational. The perfect market, in reality, is an unattainable theory of 
utopia, because almost all arbitrages are risky and costly, which can significantly limit its 
effectiveness in achieving market efficiency (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Inevitably, the 
prices in real stock markets may not fully or accurately reflect fundamental values. The 
deviation of stock price from the fundamental value is referred to as mispricing or 
misvaluation. 
Throughout the past few decades, there are conflicting viewpoints and evidences 
among scholars in regard to how much stock prices reflect their fundamental value. Fama 
(1970) proposes the efficient market hypothesis, where prices fully reflect available 
information. Subsequently, Shiller (1981) reports that stock price volatility is too high to 
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be attributed to new information about future dividends. Economists and psychologists in 
the field of behavioral finance further argue that the irrational behaviours of some  
investors, such as overreaction to new information or “irrational exuberance”, can lead to 
stock mispricing (Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 2000).  
Amongst the recent greatly expanding literature on stock mispricing, we 
surprisingly find that there is no systematic analysis of its determinants. In contrast, most 
of the articles concentrate on affirming its existence or evaluating its impacts on 
corporate governance as well as financing and operating decisions. Since the beginning 
of the 2000s, mispricing is used to explain most of the stock market anomalies, corporate 
governance perplexities and moreover economic puzzles like merger waves. However, 
what causes stock mispricing? What are its determinants? In this paper, we conduct, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first systematic investigation of the determinants of stock 
mispricing. 
Stock mispricing is estimated based on two recent studies, namely Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005) and Pástor and Veronesi (PV) (2003). We 
generate four sets of mispricings by applying two different regression approaches to each 
of these two models above. The two regression methods are Fama-MacBeth (FM) 
approach and Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010) three-step regression procedure. The 
former approach gives bigger sample mean and median mispricings than the latter one for 
our mispricing sample from 1996 to 2014. Among the seven industries (Table 1) defined 
in this paper, we find that Mining, Oil and Gas (1) has the highest incidence of mispricing 
among all the industries based on the number of years an average/median firm is 
mispriced. Information and Communication (4) has the lowest incidence of mispricing, 
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and, it tends to be underpriced when it is not correctly priced. Manufacturing (2), 
Wholesale and Retail Trades (3) and Services (6) tend to be overpriced when they are not 
correctly priced. 
To investigate the determinants of mispricing, we use both contemporaneous 
regression models and models with all independent variables lagged one year to assess 
the four groups of potential determinant variables, namely limits to arbitrage, firm 
characteristics, macro-level and market sentiment variables. We report the results of both 
OLS and fixed-effects estimation methods and draw inferences based on clustered 
standard errors (Petersen, 2009).  
We find empirical evidence that stock mispricing can be affected by limits to 
arbitrage, firm risk, macrovariables and investor sentiment. Limits to arbitrage affects 
more underpricing than overpricing. Underpricing is related more to contemporaneous 
limits-to-arbitrage variables than to the one-year lagged values. Specifically, underpricing 
is negatively and significantly associated with contemporaneous bid-ask spread, 
percentage of zero trading days and illiquidity; but it is only impacted by one-year lagged 
bid-ask spread significantly. Firm risk is always negatively associated with 
contemporaneous stock pricing; but negatively and positively correlated with one-year 
lagged under- and over-pricing. Many macroeconomic and sentiment variables are 
significantly related to mispricing, however, the associations of mispricing (under- and 
over-pricing) with various macroeconomic and sentiment variables may differ for under- 
or overpricing, and for different mispricing estimations.  
Our research contributes to the literature on the measurement of stock mispricing 
by further developing the methodologies that use regression analysis with accounting 
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multiples. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first to measure mispricings in 
the Canadian stock market, and the first to investigate the determinants of mispricings.  
 
2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Influenced by Fama’s (1970) efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), security markets were 
believed to be efficient in reflecting information about individual stocks and about the 
stock market as a whole prior to 2000. The dramatic movements in the stock market 
around the turn of the millennium raised questions and concerns about the existence and 
impacts of stock mispricing and the overall rationality of the traditional finance 
framework. In response to the difficulties faced by the traditional paradigm, behavioral 
finance as a new approach to financial markets tries to resolve these inconsistencies by 
using explanations based on human behavior, both individually and in groups. In 
addition, the global financial crisis of 2007-08, which is considered by many economists 
as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, has motivated 
increased interest in stock mispricing research.  
2.1 Critics of the EMH and Evidence of Stock Mispricing 
Under the EMH, securities markets are extremely efficient in reflecting 
information about individual stocks and about the stock market as a whole. Nevertheless, 
LeRoy and Porter (1981) find that stock prices appear to be more volatile than is 
consistent with the efficient capital markets model. Shiller (1981) provides evidence that 
stock price volatility appears to be far too high (five to thirteen times) to be attributed to 
new information about future dividends. West (1988) also finds evidence in favour of the 
excess volatility hypothesis to be persuasive and states that it cannot be explained 
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adequately by standard models of expected returns or rational bubbles. Ackert and Smith 
(1993) also find apparent evidence of excess volatility when dividends are applied, 
although they are unable to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency. Nonetheless, the 
numerous findings of excess volatilities started to erode the trust in a theory which denies 
the existence of any systemic deviations of stock prices from their fundamental values.  
Associated with the EMH is the notion that stock prices should follow a “random 
walk.” If information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then the change in 
tomorrow’s price will reflect only tomorrow’s news and will be independent of the price 
changes today. Contrary to the theory, Lo and MacKinlay (1988; 2002) conclude that 
stock prices do not behave as true random walks based on their finding that short-run 
serial correlations are not zero and many successive moves occur in the same direction. 
Moreover, there appears to be various calendar effects in stock market returns. Gibbons 
and Hess (1981) document the existence of day-of-the-week effects in asset returns, and 
also find that the negative return for Monday is remarkably uniform across individual 
stocks. Haugen and Jorion (1996) confirm that the January effect stays strong even 
decades after its discovery, with no significant changes in the magnitude. Furthermore, 
many financial economists and statisticians demonstrate that stock prices are partially 
predictable on the basis of past stock prices
1
, and certain fundamental valuation metrics, 
such as the initial dividend yield (Fama & French, 1988) and price-earnings multiples 
(Campbell & Shiller, 1998).  
From the perspective of asset pricing theory, the equilibrium model is designed to 
examine the behavior of factors driving stock prices. With the rise of empirical asset 
                                                 
1
 See Pruitt and White (1988), Neftci (1991), Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997), and 
Allen and Karjalainen (1999). 
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pricing and modern event studies, evidence consistent with stock mispricing and market 
anomalies has garnered greater attention. Banz (1981) finds that smaller firms have 
higher risk-adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms. Rosenberg et al. (1985) report 
statistically significant abnormal performance for book-to-market and specific-return-
reversal strategies. Chan et al. (1991) and Fama-French (1992) detect unusually high 
average returns from stocks with high ratios of book to market value of equity in the 
Japanese and US markets, respectively. Positive (negative) earnings news also brings 
positive (negative) risk adjusted returns (Bernard & Thomas, 1989). Adding more factors 
to the CAPM has resulted in the Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor 
model and the Fama-French five-factor model (2014). This has increased the ability of 
the models to capture stock price behavior and to explain some anomalies. More recently, 
Amihud et al. (2015) find that the illiquidity return premium is positive after controlling 
for risk factors and firm characteristics across the world.   
Can these anomalies and statistically significant predictable patterns be irrefutable 
evidence in support of stock market inefficiency or stock mispricing? Malkiel (2003) 
argues that many of the significant predictable patterns may simply be the result of data 
mining, and may not be robust in different sample periods. To some extent, statistical 
significance can differ from economic significance. Moreover, mispricing or asset pricing 
anomalies documented by equilibrium models can be still problematic due to the joint 
hypothesis problem. Nevertheless, Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012) also conclude that 
mispricing due to investor sentiment is a partial explanation for many anomalies in cross-
sectional stock returns. McLean and Pontiff (2016) further empirically support the notion 
that some or all of the original cross-sectional predictability is the result of mispricing 
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based on an examination of the 97 variables from previous academic studies being able to 
predict cross-sectional stock returns.  
As opposed to the sophisticated models and complex econometric analyses, the 
several stock market crashes or booms and busts are believed by some as being more 
direct and convincing evidence that the market fails to reflect the true values of stocks. 
Proponents of this viewpoint see recent clear evidence of stock market mispricing or 
irrationality in the market crash of October 1987, the Internet bubble around 2000, and 
the housing bubble that triggered the 2007-08 global financial crisis. Behaviour financial 
economists allege that such phenomena are primarily due to psychological considerations, 
such as herd behaviour, bandwagon effect, noise trader effect, and so forth.
2
 Conrad, 
Kapadia and Xing (2014) use prospect theory to explain why individual investors hold 
overpriced stocks. The proposed explanation is that firms with a high potential for default 
(death) also tend to have a relatively high probability of extremely large (jackpot) payoffs. 
2.2 Determinants and Impacts of Stock Mispricing 
In this section, we review the literature describing the factors that contribute to 
mispricing and/or evaluate the impacts of stock mispricing on corporate behaviour. 
We begin by reiterating that behavioural financial economists perceive 
psychological considerations as being the major factor behind stock mispricing. Shleifer 
and Summers (1990) stress the roles of investor sentiment and limited arbitrage in 
determining asset prices given the existence of noise traders. Lux (1995) argues that 
irrational and rational herd behaviours affect stock markets by making bubbles transient 
phenomena and lead to repeated fluctuations around fundamental values. Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1997) theoretically prove that professional arbitrageurs may avoid extremely 
volatile arbitrage positions due to undiversifiable sentiment risk. Shiller (2000) explains 
the Internet bubble during the late 1990s as the result of psychological contagion leading 
to irrational exuberance. Brown and Cliff (2004) claim that investor sentiment may 
trigger market level under- and over-reactions, which result in temporary mispricing. 
Gilchrist et al. (2005) empirically find that dispersion in investor beliefs can lead to stock 
market bubbles. Baker and Wurgler (2007) demonstrate that investor sentiment has 
significant cross-sectional effects on stock prices. Although psychological considerations 
are associated with short-term stock mispricing, researchers cannot directly observe the 
degree of mispricing that depends on certain biases in investors’ beliefs (Barberis, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong & Stein, 
1999). 
Empirical asset pricing studies provide some explanations for equity mispricing.  
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that stocks with low (high) trading volumes tend to be 
undervalued (overvalued) by the market. Sadka and Scherbina (2007) document a close 
link between mispricing and liquidity by investigating stocks with high analyst 
disagreement, which normally leads to overpricing. Their analysis shows that high 
trading costs from analyst disagreements result in the persistence of mispricing over time, 
and that the less liquid stocks tend to be more severely overpriced. In addition to stock 
liquidity, Jones and Lamont (2002) find that the presence of short-sale constraints can 
lead to overpriced stocks, because selling short can be costly, risky and limited by legal 
and institutional constraints. When heterogeneous risk-aversion agents face margin 
constraints, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) show that required returns increase with 
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increases in both betas and margin requirements. Easton, Pinder and Uylanco (2013) rely 
on a specific case study to show that the imposition of short-sale constraints prevents 
investors from exploiting apparent mispricing. Moreover, Chu, Hirshleifer and Ma (2015) 
conclude that limits to arbitrage, particularly short sale constraints, play an important role 
in generating asset mispricing anomalies that are driven substantially by mispricing. 
Stock mispricings can also affect firm-level investment and capital structure 
strategies. Chang et al. (2007) find a significant positive relation between investment and 
proxies for mispricing, which implies that overpriced (underpriced) firms are also 
overinvested (underinvested). This investment-mispricing link is more pronounced in 
financially constrained firms (Alzahrani & Rao, 2014). Lin et al. (2010) report that the 
use of derivatives by firms is negatively associated with stock mispricing, as hedging 
improves transparency. Hertzel and Li (2010) find that equity-issuing firms with greater 
mispricings tend to decrease long-term debt and/or increase cash holdings and have lower 
returns. Warr et al. (2012) argue that equity mispricing impacts the speeds at which firms 
adjust to their target leverages, supporting the notion that equity mispricing can also be 
an important factor that alters the cost of making capital structure adjustments. Dong et al. 
(2012) document that equity issuance and total financing increase with equity 
overvaluation, and that equity issuance is more sensitive than debt issuance to mispricing.  
Furthermore, there are many articles that evaluate the impacts of stock mispricing 
on corporate investments and governance. Stock overpricing drives M&A activities. 
Shleifer & Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson & Viswanathan (2004) develop 
theoretical models for explaining why mispricings can drive M&As. The reason is that 
overvalued firms can increase shareholder wealth by using stock as currency to purchase 
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less overvalued firms. Most of the empirical evidence
3
 supports the previous theories 
about the conjecture that stock overvaluation drives M&A activities.  
Some studies cast doubt on whether shareholder wealth is truly enhanced by 
taking advantage of overvalued stocks through M&A activities, especially over the long 
term. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that mispricing is the main reason for causing the 
widely documented long-term underperformance of bidders after M&As. Moeller et al. 
(2005) find that M&A announcements are profitable in the aggregate for acquirers until 
1997. However, the losses of acquirers from 1998 through 2001 wiped out all the gains 
made earlier. They conclude that overvaluation drives M&A activities, which improves 
the wealth of acquiring-firm shareholders only in the short run and destroys it in the long 
run. Fu et al. (2013) also find that overvalued acquirers often significantly overpay for 
the targets they purchase, and those acquisitions do not produce the necessary synergy 
gains. This implies that the agency problems may be the main motive behind acquisitions 
by overvalued acquirers. 
According to agency theory, agency problems can arise because of the presence 
of information asymmetry, where agents discriminately have more information than 
owners. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) theoretically predict that asymmetric information 
can cause equity mispricing. 
Other studies also investigate the relation between agency problems and stock 
mispricings. CEO’s compensation, including cash and equity-based compensation, may 
lead to stock mispricing, as highly incentivized CEOs may engage in higher levels of 
earnings manipulation (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). Agency conflicts may cause 
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 Ang and Cheng (2006); Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson & Teoh (2006); Rhodes–Kropf 
et al. (2005); Savor & Lu (2009). 
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equity overpricing if the compensation packages of CEOs include substantial option 
grants (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000; Lie, 2005). Li et al. (2011) find a significant positive 
relation between the magnitude of equity-based compensation and the investment level, 
but no significant relation between investment level and stock mispricing. They argue 
that managers make investment decisions concerning their equity-based compensation, 
instead of catering to stock market mispricing. Pantzalis and Park (2014) utilize ten 
agency costs proxies and provide evidence that the level of agency costs is significantly 
and positively related to equity mispricing. They also find that the options grant 
component of equity-based compensation deteriorates the link between agency conflicts 
and equity mispricing.  
Jensen (2004; 2005) theorizes that overvaluation can induce managers to engage 
in activities that can sustain inflated stock prices in the short run but can destroy 
shareholder value in the long run. Such activities can be not only overinvesting in M&As 
as we have discussed earlier, but also committing frauds and managing earnings. 
Consistent with Jensen’s prediction, the empirical evidence finds that overvalued equity 
increases the likelihood of a misstated financial statement (Efendi, Srivastava, & 
Swanson, 2007) and earnings misstatements, and that price manipulation can cause sharp 
destructions in firm value (Marciukaityte & Varma, 2008). Chi and Gupta (2009) show 
that overvaluation substantially intensifies subsequent income-increasing earnings 
management activities. Such over-induced income-increasing earnings management is 
negatively related to future abnormal stock returns and operating performances, and this 





Stock mispricing is measured as the deviation of a firm’s stock price from its 
fundamental value. Firstly we estimate stock mispricing through regression analysis. 
Then we use OLS and fixed effects estimation methods with firm effects and year 
dummies, and robust standard errors to examine the relationship between the mispricing 
estimates and potential determinant variables. 
3.1 Methods for Estimating Stock Mispricing 
Prior to investigating the determinants of stock mispricing, we estimate stock 
mispricings based on two recent studies, namely Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005) and Pástor and Veronesi (PV) (2003). Four sets of 
mispricing estimates are obtained by applying two regression methods to each of these 
two models. 
3.1.1 RKRV model (MP1) 
The first two sets of mispricing estimates are based on the model developed in 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005). To measure the fundamental 
value, 𝑉𝑖𝑡 , RKRV use an accounting multiples approach to decompose the market-to-
book ratio into two components: a measure of price to fundamentals, ln (M/V), and a 
measure of fundamentals to book value, ln (V/B). The first component, which captures 
the mispricing part of the market-to-book ratio, is further decomposed into firm-specific 
and industry-specific mispricing. The design of the model is to link market equity to book 
value, with considerations of the impact of net income and leverage in explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in market values. Specifically,  
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ln(𝑀𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗,𝑡 ln(𝐵𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑛|𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡| + 𝛼3𝑗,𝑡𝐷𝑙𝑛|𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡| + 𝛼4𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
(1) 
where for firm 𝑖 for the fiscal year 𝑡, 𝑀 is market value, 𝐵 is book value, and 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is net 
income. 𝐷 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 < 0, and takes the value 0 
otherwise. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is the leverage ratio. The subscript 𝑗 denotes the jth industry. As the 
regressions are performed for each industry each year, all parameters can vary across 
various fiscal years (𝑡) and industries (𝑗).  
We make some changes to the original RKRV methodology. We still run cross-
sectional regressions for all firms by industry and by year. However, we do not use the 
industry-year coefficients directly for calculating fitted fundamental values for each firm 
each year. Instead, after outputting all the industry-year coefficients, we use a ten-year 
rolling window (year 𝑡 − 10  to 𝑡 − 1) to average the acquired coefficients (Fama & 
MacBeth, 1973) to be the parameters of the RKRV model for year 𝑡. Therefore, the 
fundamental value of firm 𝑖 in the fiscal year 𝑡 is predicted by the RKRV model with 
year 𝑡  firm characteristics, and the mean coefficients from the ten-year window 𝑡 −
10 to 𝑡 − 1. Specifically, our first set of mispricing estimates, which uses the Fama-
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∑ ?̂?𝑗,𝜏 ,  𝑘 = 0,  1,  … ,4,   𝜏 = 𝑡 − 10,  … , 𝑡 − 1, 
where ?̅?𝑘,𝑗,𝜏  (k=0,1,2,…,6) is the of set of averaged 10-year (𝑡 − 10 to 𝑡 − 1) lagged 
fitted coefficients from equation (1). Following HP (2010), we winsorize the mispricings 
at the 1% and 99% levels within each fiscal year. 
Our second set of mispricings retains the RKRV valuation model. Instead of 
running regressions per industry-year and averaging the coefficients, we apply HP’s 
three-step regression procedure to the RKRV model. HP use an unbalanced panel with 
random fixed effects for all the firms in each industry. This is achieved through a ten-year 
rolling window.  
The first step is to estimate the RKRV model using data of all firms in industry 𝑗 
from year 𝑡 − 10 to 𝑡 − 1, as: 
ln(𝑀𝑖,𝜏) = 𝛼0𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗,𝑡 ln(𝐵𝑖,𝜏) + 𝛼2𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑛|𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝜏| + 𝛼3𝑗,𝑡𝐷𝑙𝑛|𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝜏| + 𝛼4𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝜏
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,   𝜏 = 𝑡 − 10,  … , 𝑡 − 1. 
(3) 
The second step is to predict the firm’s market-to-book ratio in year 𝑡 with the set 
of coefficients obtained from the previous step. We estimate the valuation regression 
above using rolling ten-year windows of lagged data (year 𝑡 − 10  to 𝑡 − 1) in each 
industry to get a set of coefficients that we apply to each year 𝑡  with firm 𝑖 ’s 
characteristics in year 𝑡  to get a measure of predicted valuations. Specifically, the 









where ?̂?𝑘𝑗,𝑡 (k=0,1,2,…,6) is the set of fitted coefficients from equation (3) obtained from 
step one. Thus, we use characteristics in year 𝑡 and fitted coefficients estimated from 
𝑡 − 10 to 𝑡 − 1 from equation (3) to calculate predicted firm market-to-book ratios for 
fiscal year 𝑡. 
The last step is to compute mispricing, which is called relative valuations in HP 
(2010) for each firm 𝑖 in fiscal year 𝑡. Therefore, our second set of mispricing estimates, 
which use the RKRV model with HP’s three-step regression procedure, is the difference 
between the actual ln(𝑀𝑖,𝑡) and its predicted ln(𝑀𝑖,𝑡) from equation (4): 
𝑀𝑃1(𝐻𝑃)𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑀𝑖,𝑡) −  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 [ln(𝑀𝑖,𝑡)
𝐻𝑃
]. (5) 
Following HP, we also winsorize the mispricings at the 1% and 99% levels within each 
fiscal year. 
3.1.2 PV model (MP2) 
The next two sets of mispricings are based on the valuation model of Pástor and 
Veronesi (PV) (2003), as specified by Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010). Similar to the 
MP1 that is based on the RKRV model, we also compute mispricings using both the HP 
methodology and the Fama-MacBeth approach specified previously. 
Our third set of mispricing estimates is generated from the original HP (2010) 
methodology, where the mispricing estimates are obtained from the three steps based on 
the PV valuation model. The regression method is similar to that of the metric 𝑀𝑃1(𝐻𝑃). 
The first step is to estimate the following PV valuation model using data of all 








= 𝛽0𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝜏 + 𝛽2𝑗,𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝜏 + 𝛽3𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝜏 + 𝛽4𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝜏)







is the market-to-book ratio of firm 𝑖 for the fiscal year 𝑡; AGE is minus the 
reciprocal of one plus firm age
4
; 𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the dividend dummy, which is equal to one if 
firm 𝑖 paid any dividends in the fiscal year 𝑡, zero otherwise; 𝐿𝐸𝑉 is the leverage ratio, 
calculated by total debt over total assets; the natural logarithm of total assets (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) and 
net income to shareholders equity (𝑅𝑂𝐸) are measures of firm size and profitability; and 
the total return volatility (VOL) is the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the 
whole fiscal year. Following HP, we eliminate observations with market equity, book 
equity, and total assets smaller than one million, or with market-to-book ratios outside the 
range (0.01, 100). We also winsorize the values of VOL and ROE at the 1% and 99% 
levels annually as in HP.  
In the second step, we use year 𝑡 firm characteristics and coefficients estimated 
from 𝑡 − 10 to 𝑡 − 1 from equation (6) to calculate predicted firm market-to-book ratios 








= ?̂?0𝑗,𝑡 + ?̂?1𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑗,𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?3𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?4𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
+ ?̂?5𝑗,𝑡𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?6𝑗,𝑡𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 
(7) 
where ?̂?𝑘𝑗,𝑡 (k=0,1,2,…,6) is the set of fitted coefficients from equation (6) obtained in 
step one.  
                                                 
4
 Following HP, we define firm age as one plus the current year less the first year that the 
firm appears on the CFMRC/TSX tapes. 
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In the final step, we obtain our third mispricing metric as the difference between 










 from equation (7): 












Following HP, we also winsorize the mispricing estimates at the 1% and 99% levels for 
each fiscal year. 
 Our last (fourth) set of mispricing estimates retains the same model as PV (or 
HP), but runs a cross-sectional regression of equation (9) for all firms in each industry for 
each year and uses a ten-year rolling window to average the time series (Fama and 






= 𝛽0𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑗,𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑗,𝑡𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽5𝑗,𝑡𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑗,𝑡𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 
(9) 





of this metric is estimated by equation (9) with year 𝑡  firm 
characteristics and the mean fitted coefficients from the ten-year window 𝑡 − 10 to 𝑡 − 1. 













− [?̅?0𝑗,𝑡 + ?̅?1𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ?̅?2𝑗,𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + ?̅?3𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡







∑ ?̂?𝑗,𝜏 ,  𝑘 = 0,  1,  … ,4,   𝜏 = 𝑡 − 10,  … , 𝑡 − 1, 
where ?̅?𝑘,𝑗,𝜏  (k=0,1,2,…,6) is the of set of averaged 10-year (𝑡 − 10 to 𝑡 − 1) lagged 
fitted coefficients from equation (9). We also winsorize the mispricing estimates at the 
1% and 99% levels for each fiscal year. 
3.2 Regression Models for Determination of Stock Mispricing Determinants 
We specify the following regression models for assessing possible determinants 
of stock mispricing (𝑌𝑖,𝑡): 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑳𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒐𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑴𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛾4
∗ 𝑴𝒌𝒕𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(11) 
The four groups of potential determinants in the regression model (11) are limits to 
arbitrage (𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡), firm characteristics (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡), macro-level variables 
(𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑡) and market sentiment (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡). 
The three firm-level limits to arbitrage (𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡) determinants in (11) are: 
bid-ask spread (𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡), defined as the average of the daily bid-ask spread of firm 𝑖 
in fiscal year 𝑡; zero return % (𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡), calculated as the ratio of the number of 
zero return days of firm 𝑖 over the total number of trading days in the fiscal year 𝑡; and 







𝑡=1 , where 
𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the return on stock 𝑖 on day 𝑑 of fiscal year 𝑡, 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the respective daily 
volume in dollars and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the number of days for which data are available for stock 𝑖 
for fiscal year 𝑡. Only days with positive volumes are used in calculating the half version 
of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. 
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The two firm characteristics (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) included in (11) are beta (𝛽𝑖,𝑡), 
the rolling average beta from the CAPM of firm 𝑖 for the last month of fiscal year 𝑡; and 
the dividend yield (𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑡), which is the annual dividend yield of firm 𝑖 for fiscal 
year 𝑡.  
The five Macro-level determinants (𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑡) in (11) are: risk free rate (𝑅𝑓𝑡) as 
proxied by the 91-day government of Canada T-bill rate; annual GDP growth rate 
(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡), unemployment rate (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡), annual inflation rate of consumer prices (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡) 
during fiscal year 𝑡, and the Composite Leading Indicator (𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑡), which is determined 
and sourced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
5
. 
It is based on various indicators like orders and inventory changes, financial market 
indicators, business confidence surveys, and data on key sectors and trends in key trading 
partners in smaller open economies. 
The first of the five market sentiment (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡) determinants in (11) is 
the Consumer Confidence Indicator (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡). This indicator is also standardised by OECD 
based on the plans of households for major purchases and their economic situations, both 
currently and their expectations for the immediate future. The second market sentiment 
variable is the economic policy uncertainty index (𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡) that Baker, Bloom and Davis 
(2015). The third market sentiment variable is the overall terms of Senior Loan Officer 
Survey ( 𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑡)  by the Bank of Canada
6
, which summarizes the perspectives of 
respondents on price and non-price terms of business lending and on topical issues of 
interest to the Bank of Canada. The fourth and fifth market sentiment variables are two 







on-balance variables from the Bank of Canada Business Outlook Survey
7
; namely: future 
sales growth (𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺𝑡) and investment in machinery and equipment (𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑡). The five 
variables represent the sentiments of different economic actors; namely, the confidence of 
consumers, economic policy uncertainty, the accessibility of loans for potential 
borrowers, business outlook in terms of sales growth, and business investment in 
important assets which provide links to future productivity. 
We estimate equation (11) for each of the four sets of mispricing estimates 
separately for under- and for over-pricings, as the effects of the determinants are likely to 
differ or even be in opposite directions for underpricings versus overpricings. Hence, 
there are eight sets of dependent variables (𝑌𝑖,𝑡) in total.  
We use two common statistical methods, namely OLS and fixed-effects, to 
estimate various versions of regression model (11). In considering both firm and time 
effects in our panel data, we adjust our robust standard errors through clustering by fiscal 
year and firm (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008; Petersen, 2009) for both estimation 
methods. Petersen (2009) recommends that year dummies and clustered (Roger) standard 
errors be used to avoid rejecting the null hypothesis too often when both potential time-
series and cross-sectional correlations exist in the panel data. Thus, we use firm and year 
fixed effects in the fixed-effects model specifications, and draw inferences based on 
standard errors clustered by year and firm.  
Regression model (11) investigates the contemporaneous relationship between the 
stock mispricing estimates and the determinant variables. Since prior firm- or market-
level factors may affect current stock mispricing, we also regress mispricing estimates on 





one-year lagged independent variables to address potential endogeneity concerns (Adams, 
Mansi, & Nishikawa, 2010). Specifically, we estimate the following model where all the 
terms are as previously defined: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑳𝒊𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒔𝒕𝒐𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑴𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
+ 𝛾4 ∗ 𝑴𝒌𝒕𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1. 
(12) 
Since all the independent variables in regression model (12) are lagged, it can be used to 
assess the power of the explanatory variables to predict stock mispricing. 
 
4 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We begin to form our sample by extracting all available trading and return data for all the 
firms that are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) since 1960 from the Canadian 
Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC) summary information database. To ensure 
that these firms have the required financial data, we match these firms with the firms in 
five other databases in the following pecking order in decreasing importance: 1) 
Compustat (Canada), 2) Mergent Online, 3) Financial Post (FP) Advisor, 4) Capital IQ, 
and 5) StockGuide. Specifically, we first search if the required accounting and financial 
data based on the firm list from CFMRC is in Compustat (Canada). When no further 
matches are found, then we look for a match for any unmatched firms on the list using the 
next source, Mergent Online. We continue this matching process with each of the other 
three databases.  
The matching process can be challenging. For example, when merging CFMRC 
and Compustat, the biggest challenge is to find the bridge firm identifiers to link these 
two databases. Besides firm names, CFMRC has only two sets of firm identifiers: ticker 
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+ usage (indicates the times the same ticker has been used before for other firms), and 
CUSIPs. Obviously, ticker is not a good bridge between the two databases, because it can 
be reused. Moreover, the Canadian and the U.S. markets use different tickers. When a 
dual-listed firm has different tickers in the two markets, Compustat often keeps the 
American indicators as the firm’s identifier in the database. Even though CUSIP is a 
more reliable indicator, neither of the databases has uniform 9-digit standard CUSIPs for 
all firms, instead, the number of digits can range from six to nine. Compared to CFMRC, 
Compustat has several more precise identifiers such as GVKEY and PERMNO. Based on 
the criteria of uniqueness, the pair of ticker + usage is the best identifier of CFMRC, and 
GVKEY is best for Compustat. For linking those two sets of identifiers together, we 
match them through CUSIPs and firm names after retrieving each entire database since 
1960. By merging the identifiers for the same firm, we successfully merge the trading and 
return data of CFMRC with all the available firm financial data in Compustat. We 
continue matching the unmatched firms in the rest of the databases mostly based on 
searching via ticker and verifying with firm names. 
Whereas all of our four mispricing metrics require industry specifications, it is 
important to utilize an industry classification system that is desirable for the Canadian 
listed firms. RKRV (2005) use the Fama-French (1997) 12-industry classifications based 
on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), which is a widely used method in articles 
using American data. The SIC is a system for classifying industries by a four-digit code, 
established by the U.S. government in 1937 and used widely in government and private-
sector. Due to various limitations of SIC in defining new and emerging industries, it is 
gradually being supplanted by the six-digit North American Industry Classification 
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System (NAICS) since 1997. But the SIC system is still widely used in both current and 
historical contexts in the U.S. Even certain government department and agencies, such as 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), still use SIC codes. Nevertheless, the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), the biggest stock market in Canada, only includes 
NAICS codes as its sole industry classification scheme for all the listed firms in its 
annual fact book since as early as 2000. Thus, the Fama-French 12-industry classification, 
which is based on the SIC system, is not directly applicable for the Canadian market.  
Based on the first two digits of NAICS, we initialize a unique Canadian industry 
classification system particularly for TSX listed public firms and their characteristics. 
According to our Seven-sector Canadian industry classification, we divide firms into 
relatively more general sectors based on the first two digits of the NAICS codes. Table 1 
explains the specifics of our classification. Based on this sector classification scheme, we 
also exclude firms if: a) the firm’s NAICS code cannot be found in the TSX annual 
reports or in the five databases; b) the firm’s first two digits of its NAICS code is 52 
(Finance and insurance) or 53 (Real Estate and Rental and Leasing), c) the firm’s ticker 
ends with “.UN”, which indicates that it is a unit trust, and d) the firm’s book value is 
recorded as a negative number in the database(s). After ensuring that each sector has 
sufficient observations annually for obtaining our mispricing measures through 
regression analysis, we finalize our sample period from 1986 to 2014 as consisting of 
2,330 firms and 18,679 firm-year observations.  
For determinants, firm-specific and market-level variables are either indirectly 





. Consumer confidence index and composite leading indicator for 
Canada are downloaded from the website of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)
9
. Economic Policy Uncertainty index is obtained from the 
website of Baker, Bloom and Davis
10
. The variables of Senior Loan Officer Survey and 
Business Outlook Survey are from the website of Bank of Canada
11
. A brief description 
of all the sample variables, including variables for estimating mispricings and testing 
determinants and the data sources used to obtain or compute them, is described in Table 
2. 
Table 3 presents the industry distributions of our sample, and the mean values of 
each industry’s characteristics used in calculating the RKRV and PV mispricing 
estimates. We can see that among the Canadian publicly listed firms, Mining, Oil and 
Gas (1) has the largest number of firms. The smallest public industry sector is Services 
(6). Comparing the characteristics among the industries, the biggest industry sector 
Mining, Oil and Gas (1) also has the biggest average M/B ratio, lowest average leverage, 
and the smallest average AGE (minus the reciprocal of one plus the firm’s age). 
Information and Communication (4) has the highest average market value. Wholesale and 
Retail Trades (3) have the lowest volatility and biggest average AGE. Although 
Professional, Science and Technology (5) has much smaller average market value, book 
value and net income than the other industries, it has the highest average volatility and 
ROE (return on equity). 











Table 4 describes the summary statistics for all firm-level variables, including 
variables for the RKRV and HP models, and possible determinants. Information is 
presented on number of observations, mean, median and standard deviation. Panel A and 
B report the summary statistics of the mispricing estimating variables for the RKRV and 
HP model from 1986 to 2014, respectively. Because our mispricing metrics require ten 
years of lagged data, stock mispricing estimates are reported from 1996 to 2014 and tests 
of the possible determinants are over the same time period. Panel C presents the 
characteristics of the firm-level possible determinants, where beta has relatively less 
observations because the CFMRC database requires a minimum of 24 months of returns 
over the past 60 months before computing a beta. Table 5 reports the summary statistics 
for market and macro-level determinant variables, including the market sentiment 
variables. 
In the contemporaneous models (11), the contemporaneous independent variables 
are those that match their corresponding annual mispricing estimates using the method 
we used to merge the monthly market trading data with the annual accounting data. For a 
firm’s mispricing estimate for a fiscal year, we match with the monthly independent 
variables whose month matches the fiscal-year-end month of that firm in the specific 
fiscal year. For quarterly independent variables, we take yearly averages. 
 
5 STOCK MISPRICING ESTIMATES 
Summary statistics for the two mispricing metrics (MP1 from the RKRV model and MP2 
from the PV model) estimated herein using the Fama-MacBeth approach and HP’s three-
step procedure for the full sample and the sample differentiated by industry are presented 
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in Panel A and B, respectively, of Table 6. Although the inferences using 𝑀𝑃1 and 𝑀𝑃2 
are similar, 𝑀𝑃1 is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual market value over 
its predicted market value based on the RKRV model, while 𝑀𝑃2 is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of a firm’s actual market-to-book ratio over its predicted market-to-book ratio 
based on the PV model.
12
 If we compare the results of the two regression estimation 
methods for each model, we observe that the Fama-MacBeth approach always gives 
bigger mean and median mispricing estimates for our sample from 1996 to 2014. The 
mean and median mispricing estimates are negative and positive for the four sets of 
estimates for the full sample.   
Panel B1 and B2 of Table 6 present the mispricing estimates by industry for MP1 
and MP2, respectively. We observe that the levels of mispricing vary greatly from 
industry to industry, and that the mean, median and standard deviation estimated by the 
two estimation specifications are almost identical. Among our seven industrial sectors, 
Manufacturing (2) and All Others (7) have the smallest mispricing estimates based on the 
absolute means, and Wholesale & Retail Trades (3) and Services (6) have relatively 
higher levels of mispricing. 
The similarity in the time-series patterns for the four sets of mispricing estimates 
for the full sample are further illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the cross-sectional 
annual mean and median estimates from 1996 to 2014. Since 𝑀𝑃1 and 𝑀𝑃2 are different 
measures of mispricing, we use a different y-axis for MP1 and MP2. The mispricings 
associated with the Internet and housing bubbles, and the early 2000s recession are 
                                                 
12
 MP1 is essentially the natural log of the ratio of a firm’s actual market value to its 
predicted fundamental value, while MP2 is essentially the natural log of the ratio of a 
firm’s actual market-to-book ratio to its predicted market-to-book ratio. 
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evident in the figure. Similarly, the market overvaluation during 2003-07 and the 
deflation in valuations during the global financial crisis of 2007-8 are also evident in the 
graph. There are some visual differences between the MP1 and MP2 estimates. For 
example, the mean and median values of 𝑀𝑃1 are negative in 1999 while those for 𝑀𝑃2 
are positive. Based on the mean and median mispricing estimates for each industry in 
1999 reported in Table 7, we observe large differences in the 𝑀𝑃1 and 𝑀𝑃2 mispricing 
estimates for three industrial sectors; namely, Mining, Oil and Gas (1), Manufacturing (2) 
and Services (6).  
To draw robust inferences, we conduct t-tests of the mean mispricing estimates 
and Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests of the median mispricing estimates for each year from 
1996 to 2014 for each of the four sets of mispricing estimates. These test results are 
reported in Panels A and B of Table 7, respectively. We observe that these summary 
statistics are significant at the 0.05 level for most of the tests. Thus, the evidence 
indicates that both an average and a typical firm are mispriced in most years based on the 
four sets of mispricing estimates. 
In Panel C of Table 7, we summarize our inferences for the number of years that 
an average and a typical firm of the sample is over-, under- or correctly valued. We infer 
market over- (under-) valuation for an average firm in a fiscal year if all four of the 
respective means are positive (negative) and significant at the 0.05 level from the t-tests. 
Otherwise, we infer that the average firm was correctly valued during that fiscal year. We 
use a similar inference method for a typical firm by examining if all four medians in a 
fiscal year have the same sign and are significant at the 0.05 level from the Wilcoxon 
sign-ranked tests. We also report the inferences based on each of our four mispricing 
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metrics solely. Based on Panel C, the four metrics generally give similar results. For the 
19 fiscal years, the overall market is correctly priced for two or three years, and almost 
evenly under- or over-priced in the remaining years.  
Similar to the method to generate Table 7, we also conduct t-tests and Wilcoxon 
sign-ranked tests per fiscal year at the industry-level. Instead of presenting the detailed 
test statistics, we just summarize our inferences for the number of fiscal years that an 
average and a typical firm of each industry is under-, over-, or correctly valued in Table 
8. We can see that the pricing condition varies from industry to industry. Information and 
Communication (4) and All Others (7) score the most numbers of correctly-priced fiscal 
years. Information and Communication (4) is always underpriced in the years where it is 
not correctly priced. Manufacturing (2), Wholesale and Retail Trades (3) and Services (6) 
tend to be overpriced when they are not correctly priced. Mining, Oil and Gas (1) has the 
greatest incidence of mispricing among all the industries.  
 We also test the robustness per fiscal year at the industry-level between the two 
regression methods, namely Fama-Macbeth approach and HP three-step process, that we 
apply to RKRV model (MP1) and HP model (MP2). Table 9 reports the number of fiscal 
years that the mean (T-test) or median (Wilcoxon sign-ranked test) is the same at the 0.05 
level. We can see that the two regression methods tend to give different mispricing 
estimates for Mining, Oil & Gas (1) and Manufacturing (2), but analogous estimates for 
Wholesale & Retail Trades (3) and Services (6). Generally speaking, the two regression 
methods obtain more similar mispricings for MP2 than MP1, where the difference is 




6 DETERMINANTS OF STOCK MISPRICING 
As specified in Section 3.2, we investigate the determinants of mispricing estimates 
separately for under- and for over-pricings. For each of the four sets of stock under- and 
over-pricing estimates, we report the results of two specifications for the independent 
variables (i.e., contemporaneous and lagged). Both specifications include the three limits-
to-arbitrage proxies and the two firm characteristics. Specification (1) also includes the 
five macro-level variables. Specification (2) also comprises the five sentiment variables 
that represent the sentiments of different economic actors, but excludes the five 
macrovariables due to the multicollinearity effects with the five sentiment variables.  
  Results are reported using both OLS and fixed effects with year dummies. We use 
heteroscedastic robust standard errors adjusted for the correlations (clustering) within 
firm and year groups (Petersen, 2009). We report the results using both contemporaneous 
(equation 11) and one-year lagged (equation 12) independent variables. The results from 
the fixed-effects panel regressions should be more robust because they control for 
missing or unobserved time-invariant variables. 
6.1 OLS Results 
Panels A and B of Table 10 report the results of OLS panel regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered by both firm and fiscal year, when the dependent 
variables are under- and over-pricing estimates respectively. The results are based on 
model (11), which examines the contemporaneous relationship between mispricing 
estimates and potential determinants.  
Based on Panel A of Table 10, we find that the estimated coefficients of all limits-
to-arbitrage proxies are always significant. This indicates that the stock underpricing 
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estimate is more negative (stock is more underpriced) when the bid-ask spread 
(𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑), number of trading days of zero return (𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡), or stock illiquidity 
(𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄) are higher. This result is consistent with the notion that illiquidity causes prices 
to fall and that costly arbitrage allows mispricing. Beta (𝛽) is significantly and negatively 
related to the underpricing estimates, which implies that riskier firms are associated with 
stocks being more underpriced. The estimated coefficient of the dividend yield 
(𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷) is always positive and significant, which infers that a higher dividend yield is 
associated with stocks being less underpriced. The estimated coefficients of some of the 
macrovariables (𝑅𝑓, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 and 𝐼𝑛𝑓) are insignificant. The estimated coefficients of the 
unemployment rate ( 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ) and 𝐶𝐿𝐼  are positive and significant for 3 and 4, 
respectively, of the 4 estimations. With regard to the sentiment variables, the coefficient 
estimates of  𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿 are always negative and significant, which implies that firms tend to 
be more underpriced when overall business lending conditions are tighter. The coefficient 
estimates for 𝐶𝐶𝐼 are significantly and positively associated with underpricing for three 
of the four estimations (except for MP2 based on the Fama-MacBeth approach). This 
result is consistent with the notion that a rising trend in consumer confidence is generally 
beneficial for economic activities. Better economic conditions are associated with lower 
stock underpricing. 
Panel B of Table 10 presents the OLS coefficient estimates and robust t-statistics 
for each of the four sets of overpricing estimates as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient estimates for 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  are always insignificant and those for 𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑  are 
generally insignificant. Only the coefficient estimates for 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡  are always 
negative and significant. This result is consistent with the notion that more frequent 
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trading aids arbitrage activities that have an important role in reducing stock overpricing. 
The coefficient estimates of the macrovariables are generally insignificant except for the 
coefficient estimates for 𝐶𝐿𝐼  which are always significant and positive. Among the 
sentiment variables, only 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸 has significant (positive) coefficient estimates (in all 
the runs), which infers that the balance of opinion on investment in machinery and 
equipment has a positive sentiment association with stock overpricing.  
Table 11 reports similar results to those reported in Table 10 but using 
independent variables lagged one year. The most obvious difference from the previous 
results using contemporaneous independent variables is that all of the lagged sentiment 
variables are now insignificant in Panel A of Table 11. This suggests that sentiment 
variables reflect more what the mood is at that point in time and have little power to 
predict stock underpricing. 𝐶𝐿𝐼 is no longer a significant determinant of underpricing. 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 joins 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 as a significant determinant of underpricing with positive coefficient 
estimates, which indicates that a higher current unemployment rate and inflation are 
associated with subsequent less negative underpricing (stock being less underpriced). All 
the one-year-lagged firm-level variables, including the limits-to-arbitrage and firm 
characteristics, have similar coefficient estimates as in Panel A of Table 10, but with 
fewer insignificant coefficient estimates for 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 and 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡. This result indicates 
that prior firm-level variables have some power in predicting current firm underpricing, 
but have less explanatory power in explaining current firm underpricing than current 
firm-level variables. 
Panel B of Table 11 shows somewhat similar results for the limits-to-arbitrage 
variables and 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷  as Panel B of Table 10. However, the negative coefficient 
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estimates for 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 for the MP2 overpricing estimates are now significant. The 
negative coefficient estimates for 𝐼𝑛𝑓  are now significant. The positive coefficient 
estimates for 𝐶𝐿𝐼 remain significant only for the MP2(FM) mispricing estimates. The 
coefficient estimates for 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺 are now significant and positive for all the estimations. 
The coefficient estimates for the other four sentiment variables remain negative but 
become significant for the MP2 mispricing estimates.  
6.2 Fixed-effects Panel Regression Results 
To address the effect of heterogeneity caused by missing or unobserved regressors, 
we examine the determinants of stock mispricing using a fixed-effects panel regression 
with a firm effect and fiscal year dummies. Tables 12 and 13 report the results for stock 
mispricing (under- and overpricing) with contemporaneous and lagged regressors, 
respectively.  
Comparing the contemporaneous results reported in Panel A of Table 12 for 
underpricing based on fixed-effects estimations with their counterparts in Table 10 based 
on OLS estimations, we observe similar inferences for the three limits-to-arbitrage 
proxies for MP1 mispricing estimates and only for 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 for the MP2 underpricing 
estimates. The coefficient estimates are now insignificant for 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  for the MP2 
underpricing estimates. While firm risk is still a significant determinant of stock 
underpricing, the dividend yield is no longer a significant determinant of underpricing. 
Stock underpricing is now positively and significantly associated with 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 for all 
four MP underpricing estimates and with 𝐼𝑛𝑓 for the two MP1 underpricing estimates. 
This implies that an increase in the unemployment rate and inflation are associated with 
an increase in firms become less underpriced. The results for 𝐶𝐿𝐼, 𝐶𝐶𝐼 and 𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿 are 
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similar to previous results reported in Panel A of Table 10. The negative and positive 
coefficient estimates for 𝐸𝑃𝑈 and 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸, respectively, are now always significant. The 
negative coefficient estimates for 𝐸𝑃𝑈 are consistent with the notion that stocks are more 
underpriced when economic policy uncertainty is higher. The positive coefficient 
estimates for 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸 infer that stocks are underpriced less when the balance of opinion 
on investment in machinery and equipment is higher. 
We now compare the results using lagged regressors reported in Panel B of Table 
12 for overpricing with their counterparts reported in Panel B of Table 10. While the 
coefficient estimates for 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡  and 𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑  are similar to those reported in 
Table 10, the coefficient estimates for 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 are now significantly positive for the MP2 
estimates of overpricing. The coefficient estimates for 𝛽  are now significant (and 
negative). The coefficient estimates for 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 are now significant (positive). While the 
coefficient estimates for 𝐶𝐿𝐼  are no longer significant, the coefficient estimates for 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿  are now significant (and negative), and the coefficient estimates for 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸 
remain significant but now with negative signs.  
We now compare the results using contemporaneous regressors reported in Panel 
A of Table 13 for fixed-effects estimations of underpricing with their counterpart results 
reported in Table 11 for OLS estimations. The coefficient estimates remain significant for 
only one limits-to-arbitrage proxy. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for 𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
are negative but primarily significant for only the MP1 underpricing estimates. The 
coefficient estimates for 𝛽 become positive in all the estimations and remain significant 
in seven of the eight estimations. The negative coefficient estimates for 𝐺𝐷𝑃 are now 
always significant and the positive coefficient estimates for 𝑈𝑒𝑚𝑝  are no longer 
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significant for the MP1 underpricing estimates. The negative coefficient estimates for 
𝐶𝐿𝐼  are now significant for the MP2 underpricing estimates. With the exception of  
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸, all of the coefficient estimates for the other four sentiment variables are now 
positive and significant. 
We now compare the results using lagged regressors reported in Panel B of Table 
13 for fixed-effects estimations of overpricing with their counterpart results reported in 
Table 11 for OLS estimations. The coefficient estimates for 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 are no longer 
significant, while those for 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  for the MP2 estimates of overpricing remain 
significantly positive. The coefficient estimates for the five macrovariables are now 
significant. 𝐺𝐷𝑃  and 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝  are positively associated with the overpricing estimates, 
while the risk free rate, inflation and CLI are negatively associated with the overpricing 
estimates. The coefficient estimates for the five sentiment variables retain their signs but 
are now always significant. Specifically, only the coefficient estimates for 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺  are 
positive.  
In our last set of comparisons, we highlight differences in the associations 
between the mispricing estimates and the independent variables when the latter are 
contemporaneous in Table 12 and lagged in Table 13. We begin with the associations 
between the independent variables with the underpricing estimates reported in Panel A of 
each table. With regard to the limits-to-arbitrage regressors, the coefficient estimates are 
negative and always significant for contemporaneous 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡  and always 
insignificant for lagged 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 . The coefficient estimates that are negative and 
significant for contemporaneous 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄  when the dependent variable is the MP1 
underpricing estimates become insignificant when 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 is lagged. With regard to the 
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two firm-specific regressors, the coefficient estimates are always significantly negative 
for contemporaneous 𝛽 but significantly positive for lagged 𝛽. The coefficient estimates 
are insignificant for contemporaneous and lagged 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 . With regard to the five 
macrovariables, the insignificant positive and negative coefficient estimates for 
contemporaneous 𝑅𝑓 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃 become significant when these two independent variables 
are lagged. The positive coefficient estimates for 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 become insignificant for the 
MP1 underpricing estimates while those for 𝐼𝑛𝑓  become significant for the MP2 
underpricing estimates. The positive and significant coefficient estimates for 𝐶𝐿𝐼 become 
insignificant for the MP1 underpricing estimates and remain significant but change sign 
for the MP2 underpricing estimates. With regard to the five sentiment variables, the 
coefficient estimates are always significant and positive for contemporaneous and lagged 
CCI. They are always significant but negative for contemporaneous 𝐸𝑃𝑈 and 𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿 and 
positive for lagged 𝐸𝑃𝑈  and 𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿 . The positive coefficient estimates that are only 
significant for the MP2 underpricing estimates for contemporaneous 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺  are 
significant for the MP1 and MP2 underpricing estimates for lagged 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺 . The positive 
coefficient estimates that are significant for all underpricing estimates for 
contemporaneous 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸 become insignificant for lagged 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸. 
We now examine the associations between the independent variables with the 
overpricing estimates reported in Panel B of Tables 12 and 13. With regard to the limits-
to-arbitrage regressors, the coefficient estimates are negative and always significant for 
contemporaneous  𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡  and always insignificant for lagged 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 . With 
regard to the two firm-specific regressors, the coefficient estimates are always 
significantly negative for contemporaneous 𝛽 but significantly positive for lagged 𝛽. The 
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coefficient estimates are negative and sometimes significant for contemporaneous 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷  but always insignificant for lagged 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 . With regard to the five 
macrovariables, the insignificant coefficient estimates for contemporaneous 𝑅𝑓 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
become significant (negative and positive, respectively) when these two independent 
variables are lagged. The positive coefficient estimates for 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 remain significantly 
positive. While the coefficient estimates for contemporaneous 𝐼𝑛𝑓  and 𝐶𝐿𝐼  are 
insignificant, they are negative and significant for their lagged counterparts. With regard 
to the five sentiment variables, the coefficient estimates for contemporaneous CCI and 
𝐸𝑃𝑈 are always insignificant but become significantly negative when these independent 
variables are lagged. The coefficient estimates are negative and significant for both 
contemporaneous and lagged 𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿  and 𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸 . The positive but insignificant 




We estimate Canadian stock mispricing through regression analysis based on two recent 
studies, namely Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005) and Pástor 
and Veronesi (PV) (2003). For each of the two models above, we obtain four sets of 
mispricing estimates by applying two regression methods, namely Fama-MacBeth (FM) 
approach and Hoberg and Phillips (HP) (2010) three-step regression procedure. The 
Fama-MacBeth approach always gives bigger sample mean and median mispricing 
estimates than the HP procedure for our mispricing sample from 1996 to 2014. Among 
the seven industries defined in this paper, we find that Mining, Oil and Gas (1) has the 
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highest incidence of mispricing based on the number of year an average/median firm is 
mispriced. Information and Communication (4) has the lowest incidence of mispricing, 
although it tends to be underpriced when it is not correctly priced. In contrast, 
Manufacturing (2), Wholesale and Retail Trades (3) and Services (6) tend to be 
overpriced when they are not correctly priced. 
As the effects of the determinants are likely to differ for underpricings versus 
overpricings, we analyze each of the four sets of mispricing estimates separately for 
under- and for over-pricings. Both OLS and fixed-effects methods with clustered 
standard errors are used to assess the four groups of potential determinant variables, 
namely limits to arbitrage, firm characteristics, macro-level and market sentiment 
variables. We report the estimations using both contemporaneous and one-year lagged 
regressors. The estimates from the OLS and fixed-effects estimates often lead to different 
inferences, especially for the sentiment and macro-level variables. The results from the 
fixed-effects panel regressions should be more robust because they control for missing or 
unobserved time-invariant variables.  
We find empirical evidence that stock mispricing can be affected by limits to 
arbitrage, firm risk, macrovariables and investor sentiment. Limits to arbitrage affects 
more underpricing than overpricing. Underpricing is also related more to 
contemporaneous limits-to-arbitrage variables than to the one-year lagged values. 
Specifically, underpricing is negatively and significantly associated with 
contemporaneous bid-ask spread, percentage of zero trading days and illiquidity; but it is 
only impacted by one-year lagged bid-ask spread significantly. Firm risk is always 
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negatively associated with contemporaneous stock mispricing; but negatively and 
positively correlated with one-year lagged under- and over-pricing.  
Many macroeconomic and sentiment variables are significantly related to 
mispricing, however, the associations of mispricing (under- and over-pricing) with 
various macroeconomic and sentiment variables may differ for under- or overpricing, and 
for different mispricing estimations. According to regression models with 
contemporaneous independent variables, mispricing (under-/overpricing) is positively 
and negatively related to unemployment rate and the perspective of overall business 
lending condition. Additionally, underpricing is positively associated with inflation, 
composite leading index, consumer confidence index and the balance of opinion on 
investment in machinery and equipment; and negatively associated with economic policy 
uncertainty index. While overpricing is still significantly affected by the balance of 
opinion on investment in machinery and equipment, however, the relationship becomes 
negative.  
On the basis of regression models with one-year lagged independent variables, 
overpricing is significantly associated with every single lagged macro-level or sentiment 
variable. The majority of their coefficients are negative, but positive for GDP growth rate, 
unemployment rate and the balance opinion on future sales growth. For underpricing, the 
coefficients remain positive for inflation and the perspective of overall business lending 
condition, but change to the opposite signs for the other sentiment and macro variables. 
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9 APPENDIX: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Canadian Industry Classification 
This table reports our division of Canadian firms into seven industrial sectors based on 
the first two digits of the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) codes.  




First two digits of 
the NAICS code 
Description 
(1) 21 Mining, Oil and Gas 
(2) 31-33 Manufacturing 
(3) 42, 44 &  45 Wholesale and Retail Trades 
(4) 51 Information and Communication 
(5) 54 Professional, Science and Technology 
(6) 55-81 Services 
(7) 11, 22, 23, 48, 49 
All Others, including Agriculture, Utilities, 





Table 2. Variable Definitions and Primary Data Source 
 
Variable Explanation Data source 
Estimation of mispricing 
Market value  Market value of common shares CFMRC/TSX 













One plus the current year less the first year that the 
firm appears on CFMRC/TSX database 
CFMRC/TSX 
Total return volatility 
Standard deviation of daily stock returns during the 
fiscal year 
CFMRC/TSX 




   
   Determination of mispricing determinants 
Bid-ask spread Average of the daily bid-ask spread in the fiscal year CFMRC/TSX 
Zero return % 
Ratio of the number of zero return days over the total 
number of trading days in the fiscal year 
CFMRC/TSX 
The half version of 
Amihud (2002) ratio 
Average ratio of the daily absolute return over the 
daily dollar trading volume in the fiscal year; only 
days with positive volumes are used. 
CFMRC/TSX 
Beta Firm’s CAPM beta CFMRC/TSX 
Dividend yield Annual dividend yield CFMRC/TSX 
Risk free rate The 91-day government of Canada T-bill rate CFMRC/TSX 
GDP growth rate Annual GDP growth rate World Bank 
Unemployment rate Annual unemployment rate World Bank 
Inflation rate Annual inflation rate of consumer prices World Bank 
Composite leading 
indicator 
Standardised by OECD OECD 
Consumer confidence 
indicator 
Standardised by OECD OECD 
Economic policy 
uncertainty index 
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) 
Webside of Baker, Bloom and 
Davis 
Senior Loan Officer 
survey: overall terms 
Standardised by Bank of Canada Bank of Canada 
Business Outlook Survey: 
future sales growth 
Standardised by Bank of Canada Bank of Canada 
Business Outlook Survey: 
investment in machinery 
and equipment 




Table 3. Industry Characteristics Used in Mispricing Valuation Models 
Industry definitions are described in Table 1. Observations describe the minimum, maximum, and mean number of observations per 
year in each industry. All the characteristic variables are the equal-weighted average values for the industry. Leverage is total debt 
over total assets. AGE is minus the reciprocal of one plus the firm’s age. ROE is net income divided by common equity. Our sample is 
from 1986 to 2014 for the mispricing estimates. 
Industry 
Sectors 






Leverage M/B AGE 
Dividend 
dummy 
SIZE* ROE Volatility 
Min. Max. Mean 
(1) 106 465 264 932.180 557.399 24.835 0.300 9.965 -0.181 0.198 4.891 0.311 0.0034 
(2) 110 238 175 1120.110 825.981 42.676 0.462 3.597 -0.131 0.455 5.458 0.305 0.0021 
(3) 20 50 40 1582.320 737.194 94.359 0.523 2.159 -0.115 0.688 5.934 0.221 0.0015 
(4) 22 68 44 1859.720 700.417 21.209 0.485 6.036 -0.145 0.474 5.576 0.378 0.0025 
(5) 9 84 46 465.810 181.788 6.344 0.390 4.672 -0.181 0.208 4.335 0.636 0.0036 
(6) 15 60 36 1117.110 660.989 52.261 0.508 2.376 -0.139 0.559 5.719 0.287 0.0024 
(7) 19 61 39 1802.460 880.676 92.486 0.524 1.626 -0.132 0.575 6.123 0.203 0.0019 
Sample 339 896 632 1116.310 650.270 38.148 0.402 6.168 -0.156 0.361 5.239 0.323 0.0028 




Table 4. Summary Statistics for Firm-Level Variables 
This table reports summary statistics for all firm-level variables including variables for 
the RKRV and HP mispricing estimation models and possible determinants of the 
mispricing estimates. The number of observations, means, medians and standard 
deviations are reported. All firm-level trading and return data are from the Canadian 
Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC) summary information database. The 
accounting data is from five databases in the following pecking order in decreasing 
importance: 1) Compustat (Canada), 2) Mergent Online, 3) Financial Post (FP) Advisor, 
4) Capital IQ, and 5) StockGuide. Our final sample from 1986 to 2014 consists of 2,330 
firms and 18,679 firm-year observations. Stock mispricing estimates are reported from 
1996 to 2014 due to the use of a ten-year lagged rolling window. Bid-ask spread is the 
average of the daily bid-ask spread for the fiscal year. Zero return % is the ratio of the 
number of zero return days divided by the total number of trading days during the fiscal 
year. Amihud (2002) illiquity ratio is the average ratio of the absolute daily return over 
the daily dollar volume for the fiscal year. Beta (monthly) is obtained directly from 
CFMRC database, which is the rolling average beta from the CAPM. A minimum of 24 
months of the returns over the past 60 months are required before a beta is calculated. 
Dividend yield is the annual dividend yield. 
Variable Symbol N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Panel A: Mispricing estimating variables for RKRV model (1986-2014) 
Market value  𝑀 18,375 1126.290 128.456 4742.510 
Book value  𝐵 18,542 655.194 86.906 2595.990 
Net income 𝑁𝐼 18,426 38.738 1.837 875.876 
Leverage 𝐿𝐸𝑉 18,536 0.402 0.410 0.228 
Panel B: Mispricing estimating variables for HP model (1986-2014) 
Market-to-book ratio 𝑀/𝐵 18,220 2.254 1.478 3.447 
AGE 𝐴𝐺𝐸 18,220 -0.156 -0.111 0.144 
Leverage 𝐿𝐸𝑉 18,215 0.399 0.407 0.225 
Total asset 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 18,220 5.285 5.076 1.914 
Return on equity 𝑅𝑂𝐸 18,220 0.280 0.117 0.724 
Total return volatility 𝑉𝑂𝐿 18,220 0.003 0.001 0.005 
Panel C: Firm-level possible determinants (1996-2014) 
Bid-ask spread 𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 14,316 0.050 0.023 0.457 
Zero return % 𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 14,317 0.115 0.108 0.083 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 14,302 0.073 1.148 0.001 
Beta (CAPM) 𝛽 11,458 1.182 1.009 0.917 
Dividend yield 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 14,321 0.010 0.000 0.031 




Table 5. Summary Statistics for Market and Macroeconomic Variables  





Minimum Maximum Average 
From To 
Risk free rate 𝑅𝑓 Monthly 1996 2014 0.460 1.560 1.004 
GDP growth rate 𝐺𝐷𝑃 Annually 1996 2014 -2.711 5.123 2.572 
Unemployment rate 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 Annually 1996 2014 6.000 9.600 7.550 
Inflation rate 𝐼𝑛𝑓 Annually 1996 2014 0.299 2.912 1.914 
Composite leading indicator 𝐶𝐿𝐼 Monthly 1996 2014 95.996 101.386 99.864 
Consumer confidence index 𝐶𝐶𝐼 Monthly 1996 2014 96.837 101.695 100.101 
Economic policy uncertainty 
index 
𝐸𝑃𝑈 Monthly 1996 2014 30.097 399.846 119.849 
Senior loan officer survey: 
overall terms 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿 Quarterly 1999 2014 -25.013 48.270 5.401 
Business outlook survey: future 
sales growth 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺 Quarterly 1998 2014 -9.500 30.000 13.847 
Business outlook survey: 
investment in machinery and 
equipment 





Table 6. Summary Statistics for the Mispricing Estimates for the Whole Sample and 
for Each Industrial Sector 
This table reports summary statistics for the mispricing estimates of the entire sample (Panel A) 
and for each industry (Panel B). The sample contains 2,330 firms (18,679 firm-year observations) 
from 1986 to 2014. The mispricing estimates are reported from 1996 due to 10-year lagged 
rolling window required for the estimation of mispricing. We employ four mispricing metrics 
based on two models, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Pástor and Veronesi 
(2003). We apply two regression procedures to each model. One regression method is based on 
Fama-MacBeth approach. We run regressions by industry-year and average the coefficients using 
a ten-year rolling window (𝑡 − 10 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 − 1). Then we predict the valuation for firm 𝑖 using the 
fiscal year 𝑡 characteristics with the set of estimated coefficients from the previous step. Lastly, 
we calculate the mispricing estimate for fiscal year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 as the difference between the 
actual and predicted valuations. The other regression method uses the three-step procedure 
specified in Hoberg and Phillips (2010).  
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Mispricing Estimates for the Whole Sample 
Mispricing 
Estimates 
N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
10th % 90th % 
MP1(FM) 14212 -0.016227 0.029761 0.8839 -1.1424 1.0365 
MP1(HP) 14212 -0.025553 0.015357 0.8797 -1.1402 1.0233 
MP2(FM) 14305 -0.013666 0.028792 0.91625 -1.1068 1.0381 
MP2(HP) 14305 -0.027497 0.002206 0.87201 -1.1181 1.0142 
Panel B1: Summary Statistics for MP1 for Each Industry 
Industry 
N   Mean   Median   Standard Deviation 
FM HP   FM HP   FM HP   FM HP 










































(7) 880 880   0.011 -0.004   0.046 0.037   0.708 0.713 
Sample 14212 14212   -0.016 -0.026   0.030 0.015   0.884 0.880 
Panel B2: Summary Statistics for MP2 for Each Industry 
Industry 
N   Mean   Median   Standard Deviation 
FM HP   FM HP   FM HP   FM HP 
(1) 6137 6137  -0.046 -0.066  0.009 -0.017  0.896 0.892 
(2) 3632 3632  0.051 0.009  0.074 0.019  0.894 0.876 
(3) 742 742  0.023 0.109  0.118 0.123  0.822 0.717 
(4) 926 926  -0.152 -0.053  -0.057 -0.010  1.036 0.958 
(5) 1150 1150  -0.113 -0.036  -0.082 -0.038  1.049 0.892 
(6) 830 830  0.211 -0.006  0.169 -0.033  1.016 0.864 
(7) 888 888  -0.018 -0.009  0.019 0.022  0.733 0.689 




Table 7. T-Test and Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test at the Market-Level 
This table reports the results of t-tests and Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests on the mean and median mispricing estimates for the four 
metrics for the whole sample annually from 1996 to 2014 (19 years in total). Panel A shows the annual mean mispricing estimates, 
and t-statistics and p-values for the test that the mean value equals zero. Panel B presents the median mispricing estimates and 
Wilcoxon sign-ranked test statistics and p-values for the test that the median values equal zero. Panel C summaries both Panel A and 
B, and reports the number of years that the whole market is underpriced, fairly priced or overpriced (see the descriptor for Panel C for 
greater details). .  
Panel A: T-test on the mean mispricing estimates  
Fiscal 
Year 
MP1(FM)   MP1(HP)   MP2(FM)   MP2(HP) 
mean t p-value  mean t p-value  mean t p-value  mean t p-value 
1996 0.244 8.542 0.000  0.213 7.549 0.000  0.205 6.591 0.000  0.200 6.939 0.000 
1997 0.130 4.686 0.000  0.097 3.502 0.000  0.088 2.930 0.004  0.095 3.419 0.001 
1998 -0.181 -5.800 0.000  -0.221 -7.140 0.000  -0.085 -2.531 0.012  -0.137 -4.502 0.000 
1999 -0.062 -1.829 0.068  -0.074 -2.196 0.028  0.161 3.817 0.000  0.105 2.786 0.005 
2000 -0.237 -7.249 0.000  -0.255 -7.862 0.000  -0.062 -1.625 0.105  -0.198 -5.994 0.000 
2001 -0.216 -6.292 0.000  -0.207 -6.052 0.000  -0.238 -5.387 0.000  -0.193 -5.470 0.000 
2002 -0.165 -4.974 0.000  -0.149 -4.494 0.000  -0.174 -4.948 0.000  -0.117 -3.600 0.000 
2003 0.210 7.327 0.000  0.227 7.818 0.000  0.168 5.464 0.000  0.215 7.257 0.000 
2004 0.302 11.254 0.000  0.305 11.360 0.000  0.229 8.515 0.000  0.259 9.642 0.000 
2005 0.361 13.338 0.000  0.357 13.267 0.000  0.275 10.328 0.000  0.301 11.612 0.000 
2006 0.327 12.833 0.000  0.300 11.816 0.000  0.245 9.661 0.000  0.219 8.831 0.000 
2007 0.213 7.679 0.000  0.167 6.088 0.000  0.129 4.658 0.000  0.077 2.810 0.005 
2008 -0.693 -20.924 0.000  -0.753 -22.494 0.000  -0.558 -16.840 0.000  -0.647 -19.689 0.000 
2009 0.007 0.253 0.800  -0.017 -0.592 0.554  0.058 1.958 0.051  0.014 0.470 0.638 
2010 0.242 8.605 0.000  0.223 7.913 0.000  0.175 6.258 0.000  0.151 5.414 0.000 
2011 -0.099 -3.602 0.000  -0.102 -3.681 0.000  -0.138 -4.971 0.000  -0.141 -5.114 0.000 
2012 -0.224 -7.084 0.000  -0.198 -6.309 0.000  -0.237 -7.793 0.000  -0.231 -7.588 0.000 
2013 -0.268 -7.305 0.000  -0.217 -6.130 0.000  -0.269 -7.805 0.000  -0.243 -7.220 0.000 






Panel B of Table 7: Wilcoxon sign-ranked test on the median mispricing estimates  
 
Panel C of Table 7: Summary of the market pricing conditions 1996-2014 
We infer market over-/ under- valuation for an average (median) firm in a fiscal year if all four of the respective means (medians) are 
positive/negative and significant at the 0.05 level from the t-tests (Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests). 
Test 
Number of Fiscal Years 
Undervalued Correctly Valued Overvalued 
T-test 8 3 8 
Wilcoxon sign-ranked test 9 2 8 
Fiscal 
Year 
MP1(FM)   MP1(HP)   MP2(FM)   MP2(HP) 
median w p-value  median w p-value  median w p-value  median w p-value 
1996 0.246 37668.0 0.000  0.206 32668.0 0.000  0.223 35091.0 0.000  0.174 30236.0 0.000 
1997 0.187 25295.5 0.000  0.151 19879.5 0.000  0.148 19235.0 0.000  0.133 18437.0 0.000 
1998 -0.143 -28686.5 0.000  -0.197 -35629.5 0.000  -0.087 -15767.5 0.002  -0.130 -24391.5 0.000 
1999 -0.057 -14083.0 0.017  -0.087 -16936.0 0.004  0.052 15481.5 0.009  -0.006 7637.5 0.198 
2000 -0.244 -43142.5 0.000  -0.278 -47033.5 0.000  -0.095 -12339.5 0.042  -0.224 -34740.5 0.000 
2001 -0.147 -29848.5 0.000  -0.132 -28677.5 0.000  -0.117 -21816.5 0.000  -0.110 -25395.5 0.000 
2002 -0.080 -20792.0 0.000  -0.077 -18858.0 0.000  -0.082 -19349.5 0.000  -0.065 -15355.5 0.004 
2003 0.197 41329.5 0.000  0.206 43298.5 0.000  0.198 37078.0 0.000  0.226 40983.0 0.000 
2004 0.306 62683.0 0.000  0.291 62897.0 0.000  0.256 53033.5 0.000  0.279 56232.5 0.000 
2005 0.385 82307.5 0.000  0.362 81688.5 0.000  0.305 71444.0 0.000  0.310 74624.0 0.000 
2006 0.271 84703.5 0.000  0.243 77541.5 0.000  0.242 70068.5 0.000  0.205 61330.5 0.000 
2007 0.194 60686.5 0.000  0.149 47859.5 0.000  0.130 39898.0 0.000  0.091 24468.0 0.002 
2008 -0.632 -124096.0 0.000  -0.715 -130657.0 0.000  -0.540 -104797.0 0.000  -0.654 -118012.0 0.000 
2009 0.028 5394.0 0.405  0.021 -556.0 0.932  0.082 14039.0 0.030  0.030 4926.0 0.448 
2010 0.265 61722.0 0.000  0.241 56425.0 0.000  0.199 45933.5 0.000  0.191 40956.5 0.000 
2011 -0.092 -24505.0 0.000  -0.103 -26394.0 0.000  -0.123 -32867.5 0.000  -0.139 -35282.5 0.000 
2012 -0.180 -41813.5 0.000  -0.180 -37429.5 0.000  -0.218 -46873.0 0.000  -0.208 -44525.0 0.000 
2013 -0.168 -36413.0 0.000  -0.128 -29315.0 0.000  -0.258 -42123.5 0.000  -0.250 -39520.5 0.000 
2014 -0.223 -21518.5 0.000  -0.179 -17471.5 0.000  -0.288 -27925.5 0.000  -0.266 -25776.5 0.000 
16 
 
Table 8. T-Test and Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test at the Industry-Level 
This table reports t-test and Wilcoxon sign-ranked test results per fiscal year at the industry-level. 
Instead of presenting the detailed test statistics, we just summarize our inferences for the number 
of fiscal years that an average and a typical firm of one industry is under-, over, or correctly 
valued (see descriptors to Panel C of Table 7 for greater details on the determination method).  
Industry 
Sector 
Number of Fiscal Years (t-test) 
  











(1) 7 4 8 
 
8 3 8 
(2) 2 11 6 
 
2 11 6 
(3) 1 14 4 
 
1 14 4 
(4) 4 14 1 
 
3 15 1 
(5) 4 12 3 
 
3 13 3 
(6) 1 14 3 
 
1 13 3 
(7) 1 16 2   1 14 4 
 
 
Table 9. T-Test and Wilcoxon Sign-Ranked Test between the Two Regression Methods 
This table reports the number of fiscal years that the mean (T-test) or median (Wilcoxon sign-
ranked test) is the same at the 0.05 level. We test the robustness per fiscal year at the industry-
level between the two regression methods, namely Fama-MacBeth approach and HP three-step 




Number of Fiscal Years (t-test)  
Number of Fiscal Years  
(Wilcoxon sign-ranked test) 
MP1 MP2  MP1 MP2 
(1) 3 5  4 4 
(2) 5 9  3 5 
(3) 11 13  10 14 
(4) 9 8  9 7 
(5) 7 13  8 16 
(6) 12 12  8 9 





Table 10. OLS Regression Models with Contemporaneous Independent Variables 
This table reports summary OLS regression results for the various underpricing estimates in Panel A and for the various overpricing 
estimates in Panel B when the independent variables are contemporaneous.  The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both year and firm (Petersen, 2009). 
Panel A of Table 10: Dependent variable is the estimated underpricings  
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Panel B of Table 10: Dependent variable is the estimated overpricings 
  Dependent Variable 
 MP1(FM) Overpricings  MP1(HP) Overpricings  MP2(FM) Overpricings  MP2(HP) Overpricings 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.1692(1.08) 0.1394(0.88)  0.1756(1.05) 0.1342(0.81)  0.7215**(2.42) 0.6297**(2.22)  0.4437*(1.65) 0.4098(1.53) 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 -0.6947***(-4.69) -0.7224***(-4.95)  -0.6241***(-4.12) -0.6226***(-4.22)  -0.8074***(-4.16) -0.8173***(-4.14)  -0.8057***(-4.33) -0.8003***(-4.16) 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.0007(0.06) 0.0014(0.12)  -0.0036(-0.32) -0.0020(-0.17)  0.0146(0.81) 0.0138(0.75)  0.0050(0.56) 0.0041(0.46) 
𝛽 0.0214(1.18) 0.0123(0.75)  0.0210(1.14) 0.0110(0.65)  0.0207(1.24) 0.0074(0.50)  0.0110(0.67) -0.0001(-0.01) 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 -1.1056(-1.31) -2.4719***(-5.00)  -1.0609(-1.29) -2.4401***(-4.70)  -1.0890(-1.35) -2.4586***(-4.87)  -1.0069(-1.25) -2.3636***(-4.64) 
𝑅𝑓 0.0041(0.44)   0.0009(0.09)   0.0207*(1.86)   0.0161(1.63)  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.0048(0.85)   0.0049(0.87)   0.0125*(1.71)   0.0068(0.98)  
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 -0.0086(-0.56)   -0.0105(-0.69)   0.0020(0.12)   0.0062(0.38)  
𝐼𝑛𝑓 -0.0006(-0.05)   0.0084(0.58)   -0.0216(-1.16)   -0.0071(-0.37)  
𝐶𝐿𝐼 0.0431***(6.27)   0.0464***(7.14)   0.0313***(3.29)   0.0384***(3.82)  
𝐶𝐶𝐼  0.0178(1.02)   0.0169(1.04)   0.0228(0.89)   0.0283(1.59) 
𝐸𝑃𝑈  -0.0003(-1.35)   -0.0003(-1.50)   -0.0004(-1.46)   -0.0003(-1.32) 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿  -0.0003(-0.43)   -0.0004(-0.67)   0.0015(1.19)   0.0008(0.83) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺  0.0005(1.12)   0.0007(1.50)   0.0010(0.76)   0.0018*(1.88) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸  0.0019**(2.47)   0.0018**(2.25)   0.0031**(2.07)   0.0017*(1.68) 
 
           
N 5838 5046  5752 4990  5913 5090  5820 5025 




Table 11. OLS Regression Models with Lagged Independent Variables 
This table reports summary OLS regression results for the various underpricing estimates in Panel A and for the various overpricing 
estimates in Panel B when the independent variables are lagged one year.  The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by both year and firm (Petersen, 2009). 
Panel A of Table 11: Dependent variable is the estimated underpricings  
  Dependent Variable 
 MP1(FM) Underpricings  MP1(HP) Underpricings  MP2(FM) Underpricings  MP2(HP) Underpricings 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -0.3101**(-2.50) -0.2883***(-2.81)  -0.3252**(-2.50) -0.3012***(-2.82)  -0.2393***(-4.00) -0.2259***(-4.88)  -0.2296***(-3.56) -0.2167***(-4.25) 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 -0.9294***(-2.59) -1.1112***(-3.21)  -0.8818***(-2.58) -1.0661***(-3.24)  -0.5520(-1.45) -0.6510*(-1.71)  -0.5983*(-1.79) -0.7266**(-2.22) 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 -0.0408***(-2.61) -0.0423***(-2.76)  -0.0398**(-2.53) -0.0414***(-2.66)  -0.0213(-1.22) -0.0221(-1.28)  -0.0179(-1.23) -0.0201(-1.38) 
𝛽 -0.0929***(-4.75) -0.0973***(-4.39)  -0.0898***(-4.17) -0.0937***(-3.71)  -0.1009***(-4.43) -0.1098***(-4.60)  -0.0791***(-4.41) -0.0826***(-4.01) 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 1.6551***(4.41) 1.3334***(3.88)  1.5909***(4.38) 1.2659***(3.85)  1.1778***(3.29) 0.9390**(2.41)  1.0331***(2.65) 0.7965*(1.92) 
𝑅𝑓 -0.0055(-0.26)   -0.0123(-0.53)   -0.0114(-0.58)   -0.0032(-0.17)  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.0239(-1.31)   -0.0182(-0.94)   -0.0140(-0.97)   -0.0177(-1.14)  
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 0.1120***(2.76)   0.1054**(2.36)   0.0869**(2.56)   0.1017***(2.79)  
𝐼𝑛𝑓 0.0668**(2.20)   0.0569*(1.85)   0.0473*(1.71)   0.0556**(1.98)  
𝐶𝐿𝐼 -0.0234(-0.98)   -0.0236(-0.94)   -0.0254(-1.12)   -0.0329(-1.59)  
𝐶𝐶𝐼  -0.1220(-1.38)   -0.1421(-1.50)   -0.1005(-1.44)   -0.1302(-1.63) 
𝐸𝑃𝑈  -0.0014(-1.32)   -0.0016(-1.47)   -0.0009(-1.04)   -0.0015(-1.62) 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿  -0.0027(-0.92)   -0.0035(-1.14)   -0.0027(-1.24)   -0.0035(-1.34) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺  0.0041(1.05)   0.0046(1.21)   0.0027(0.78)   0.0022(0.69) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸  -0.0020(-0.61)   -0.0031(-0.93)   -0.0024(-0.81)   -0.0033(-1.17) 
 
           
N 4792 4122  4852 4164  4742 4137  4804 4161 





Panel B of Table 11: Dependent variable is the estimated overpricings 
  Dependent Variable 
 MP1(FM) Overpricings  MP1(HP) Overpricings  MP2(FM) Overpricings  MP2(HP) Overpricings 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.2142(1.34) 0.1194(1.03)  0.2491(1.48) 0.1513(1.18)  0.7704**(2.07) 0.4776**(2.27)  0.4687(1.54) 0.2288(1.37) 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 -0.3036*(-1.94) -0.2802*(-1.84)  -0.2583(-1.63) -0.2147(-1.38)  -0.4324***(-2.59) -0.3769**(-2.34)  -0.4736***(-2.76) -0.4174**(-2.55) 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.0225(0.98) 0.0204(0.97)  0.0194(0.88) 0.0158(0.81)  0.0451*(1.91) 0.0453**(2.38)  0.0396**(2.02) 0.0360***(2.63) 
𝛽 0.0060(0.41) 0.0058(0.37)  0.0053(0.35) 0.0052(0.32)  -0.0069(-0.51) -0.0142(-1.13)  -0.0102(-0.76) -0.0132(-0.93) 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 -0.9515(-1.56) -1.7794***(-3.88)  -0.9255(-1.54) -1.7568***(-3.59)  -1.0459(-1.50) -2.1229***(-4.44)  -1.0551(-1.55) -2.0811***(-4.36) 
𝑅𝑓 0.0033(0.43)   0.0019(0.23)   0.0149(1.33)   0.0143(1.38)  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.0077(-1.26)   -0.0083(-1.22)   0.0106(1.13)   -0.0001(-0.01)  
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 -0.0206(-1.39)   -0.0235(-1.48)   0.0090(0.61)   0.0105(0.66)  
𝐼𝑛𝑓 -0.0241**(-2.54)   -0.0214**(-2.00)   -0.0615***(-3.28)   -0.0386*(-1.94)  
𝐶𝐿𝐼 0.0075(1.24)   0.0095(1.32)   -0.0238**(-2.53)   -0.0191(-1.63)  
𝐶𝐶𝐼  -0.0336**(-2.23)   -0.0283*(-1.67)   -0.0215(-1.14)   -0.0188(-0.91) 
𝐸𝑃𝑈  -0.0004***(-2.60)   -0.0003**(-1.96)   -0.0003(-1.21)   -0.0002(-1.18) 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿  -0.0009**(-2.11)   -0.0007(-1.29)   -0.0001(-0.12)   -0.0004(-0.58) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺  0.0020**(2.15)   0.0024***(2.87)   0.0015*(1.72)   0.0016***(2.62) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸  -0.0019**(-2.03)   -0.0019**(-1.97)   -0.0011(-0.98)   -0.0019**(-2.11) 
 
           
N 4985 4335  4925 4293  5049 4328  4987 4304 






Table 12. Fixed Effects Regression Models with Contemporaneous Independent Variables 
This table reports summary fixed-effects panel regression results for the various underpricing estimates in Panel A and for the various 
overpricing estimates in Panel B when the independent variables are contemporaneous.  The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by both year and firm (Petersen, 2009). 
Panel A of Table 12: Dependent variable is the estimated underpricings  
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Panel B of Table 12: Dependent variable is the estimated overpricings 









  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 





















































































































            







Adj R-sq 0.357 0.365   0.364 0.372   0.399 0.421   0.385 0.407 
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Table 13. Fixed Effects Regression Models with Lagged Independent Variables 
This table reports summary fixed-effects panel regression results for the various underpricing estimates in Panel A and for the various 
overpricing estimates in Panel B when the independent variables are lagged one year.  The t-statistics reported in the parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by both year and firm (Petersen, 2009). 
Panel A of Table 13: Dependent variable is the estimated underpricings  
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Panel B of Table 13: Dependent variable is the estimated overpricings 
  Dependent Variable 
 MP1(FM) Overpricings  MP1(HP) Overpricings  MP2(FM) Overpricings  MP2(HP) Overpricings 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
𝐵𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -0.1208(-0.80) -0.1719(-1.11)  -0.1101(-0.73) -0.1657(-1.09)  0.5558***(3.88) 0.3469**(2.52)  0.3510**(2.54) 0.1894(1.39) 
𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑡 -0.1585(-1.08) -0.0323(-0.20)  -0.1174(-0.79) 0.0017(0.01)  -0.0691(-0.48) -0.0141(-0.09)  -0.1630(-1.17) -0.0927(-0.61) 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄 0.0397(1.51) 0.0394(1.49)  0.0329(1.22) 0.0302(1.12)  0.0458**(2.15) 0.0443**(2.18)  0.0642***(2.75) 0.0591***(2.59) 
𝛽 -0.0617***(-4.51) -0.0521***(-3.49)  -0.0558***(-4.04) -0.0429***(-2.86)  -0.0721***(-5.22) -0.0551***(-3.87)  -0.0604***(-4.45) -0.0426***(-2.95) 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑌𝐿𝐷 -0.0336(-0.16) -0.0867(-0.21)  -0.0551(-0.26) -0.2379(-0.55)  -0.1742(-0.82) -0.5032(-1.26)  -0.1992(-0.98) -0.4393(-1.11) 
𝑅𝑓 -0.0300**(-2.56)   -0.0310***(-2.61)   -0.0149(-1.26)   -0.0202*(-1.77)  
𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.0212**(2.18)   0.0208**(2.13)   0.0357***(3.52)   0.0368***(3.78)  
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 0.0776***(4.09)   0.0840***(4.39)   0.0920***(4.82)   0.0873***(4.72)  
𝐼𝑛𝑓 -0.0700***(-3.26)   -0.0688***(-3.24)   -0.0925***(-4.11)   -0.1055***(-4.93)  
𝐶𝐿𝐼 -0.0348***(-3.64)   -0.0344***(-3.53)   -0.0491***(-5.14)   -0.0508***(-5.43)  
𝐶𝐶𝐼  -0.1639***(-6.35)   -0.1718***(-6.45)   -0.1606***(-6.93)   -0.1889***(-7.98) 
𝐸𝑃𝑈  -0.0016***(-4.78)   -0.0017***(-4.93)   -0.0017***(-5.50)   -0.0021***(-6.99) 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝐿𝐿  -0.0045***(-5.34)   -0.0048***(-5.56)   -0.0045***(-5.69)   -0.0055***(-6.99) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐺  0.0046***(3.75)   0.0050***(4.01)   0.0027**(2.32)   0.0023**(1.98) 
𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑀𝐸  -0.0030*(-1.84)   -0.0031*(-1.87)   -0.0026*(-1.71)   -0.0033**(-2.18) 
            
N 4985 4335  4925 4293  5049 4328  4987 4304 





Figure 1. Annual Mean and Median Mispricings Plot 
MP1 indicates the two mispricing metrics based on RKRV model, using Fama-MacBeth 
approach, MP1(FM), and HP three-step regression procedure, MP1(HP). Similarly, 
MP2(FM) and MP2(HP) are the two metrics based on HP model with the two above 
regression procedures. As MP1 and MP2 have different concepts and measurements, we 
plot the annual means and medians of the four mispricing metrics using the same x-axis 
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